Abstract-The emergence of the vehicular networks has led automakers and researchers to develop connected embedded applications to exchange messages as part of road safety and entertainment. Secondly, the security has become a vital prerequisite for the deployment of such networks. In terms of controlling access to resources, more heterogeneous solutions are proposed based on X.509 certificates, Kerberos tickets, Password techniques, etc. This technologies heterogeneity pushes us to find a solution in order to federate the existing techniques and even future ones.
INTRODUCTION

A. Context
Thanks to the ITS (Intelligent Traffic Systems) technology, our cars are able to embed applications that aim to exchange so vital messages in coordination with road infrastructure units to ensure the road users safety. It will be possible, also, from his vehicle to consume services in the Internet or the Cloud.
Today, we know different schools (American, European and Japanese) in the field of ITS. Thus, many projects are emerging from research laboratories of several car manufacturers and universities. Nevertheless, the technological heterogeneity will be, undoubtedly, one of the thorny issues to resolve in order to build a network of distributed applications to communicate seamlessly [6] .
Furthermore, security is a crucial prerequisite [5] for the deployment of vehicular networks and several solutions have been proposed. Access control to resources is a security aspect that has attracted the attention of researchers. Thus, varied and heterogeneous implementations have been developed based on X.509 certificates [7] [5], Kerberos tickets, the Username / Password couples [4] , etc.
B. Problematic
Before presenting our problem, let us imagine the case of a vehicle in a country "A" that uses X.509 certificates to consume different services. This same vehicle travels to another country "B" and wants to consume the same services. Yet, in the country "B", Kerberos tickets are rather used. Consequently, our problem is to find a solution that unifies the various access control techniques in the vehicular networks. The solution must be open and agile to incorporate future technologies that do not exist yet.
Web services are the best technology to build SOA. This success is due to the richness of WS-* specifications that support different aspects: orchestration, transactions, security, etc.
WS-Federation is one of the WS-* security specifications that aims to federate heteregenous authentication and access control protocols. For this reason, we considered WSFedeartion as a good candidate to solve our problematic.
However, we have to think about how to integrate vehicular applications which are not necessarily Web Services into a SOA (based on Web Services) in such way that we can apply WS-Federation.
C. Our Approach
Initially, our objective is to develop a technique for integrating vehicular applications into a SOA using the bus pattern. Our inspiration is the Enterprise Service Bus (ESB) [4] . We have adapted the ESB for the case of the vehicular networks and the new bus architecture is named VSB (Vehicular Service Bus). With VSB, it is possible to consider a vehicular network as a set of mobile and fixed nodes consuming and providing both services.
The second step is to apply the WS-Federation on our VSB architecture to solve the security heterogeneity problem.
D. Paper Structure
This paper presents the developed solution in three phases. The first one will be dedicated to the communicative architecture of the VSB. The second phase analyses the federated security module. Finally, we will by presenting some results of our work.
II. COMMUNICATIVE ARCHITEC
In this section we present, first of al network as a SOA. After that, we describ based on the VSB pattern. The VSB is des WCF 1 technology [8] allowing LOB (Lin applications integration into a SOA.
A. SOA Vision
We have studied a set of vehicular appl different communication paradigms (Pus notifications from traffic light system to vehi like a STOP command from a police car vehicle and other messaging models). Co SOA seems to be an excellent candidate to de applications. According to our vision, a vehi a set of three domains (see Fig. 1 The diagram (see Fig. 2 ) shows the components (and an example of an alert me by defining the following components:
• The VSB runtime: it is the executi containing a layer of engines exp services (transformation of message 
D. Decentralised VSB Architecture
The figure (see Fig. 4 ) describes an ex cycle of an alert message corresponding to th alert generated by a LOB application of a v alert message passed by the service ro subsequently transmitted to all involved ve retransmission is based on the content of the certain treatment on the service road bu message is transmitted through the bus of e potential treatments so that it can be manag appopriate application. The same message ca mobile device for the benefits of interactions 
A. Advantages of claims based access contro
In this type of authorization, access contr service operations is done according to th claims) of security tokens provided b consumers. Thus, access permissions dynamically into security policies.
This model offers more flexibility than roles, resources, etc.) for the following advan • Decoupling authen applications and serv consumer has to authentication protoc abstract and oriente support existing au even future ones.
• All credential types them according a giv
• Possibility of trans format to another.
• This paradigm is bas containing service service consumer according the policy claims.
B. Federated Access Contro
In this section, we pro federated access control app architecture is based on the a (WS-Federation Active Req this profile is supported by th into different process types addition, the active pro applications, which correspo applications.
A federated architecture i entities :
• Client: in our case, wishing to consume network, the Internet
• The service: it is a s consume. Imagine th service.
• The Security Toke security tokens requ via WS-Trust. A tru the exposed service.
The following figure (se architecture of an example o police car) trying to updat service:
delete this text box. ntication mechanisms from vices. Otherwise, an application o implement all supported cols. Nevertheless, the model is ed tokens in such way it can uthentication mechanisms and are supported. Just serializing ven format is sufficient.
forming the tokens from one sed on defining security policies requested claims. Thus, the has to deliver just tokens y and containing the requested A vehicle which is equipped with a application in output (for example) and de that is responsible for consuming the ser federation active profile follows these steps: vehicle discovers the service through the WS retrieves the security policy set on a federat WS-SecurityPolicy and WS-MetadataExchan expresses the claims to be included in the sec must be issued by one ore more determin Then, the native identity of the vehicle w correspond to the requested claims is sent to a security token request message (RST (R Token)) (2). It should be noted, also, implements the WS-Trust that allow management. The STS then authenticates th vehicle and provides the required token (SA for instance) (3) and generates, therefore, the RST request as a data structure called R Security Token Response) (4) that contains th
• The serialized token, signed by containing the required claims and encrypted with the public key of consume. The token is also encr public key of the service to consume • The proof key for the vehicle applica The RSTR is protected by the policy e Binding of the STS. The vehicular applicati proof key from the RSTR and sign the messa the service using the proof key (5). Th authenticates the token sent with the public retrieves the proof key from the token with it authenticate the vehicle application as a rea request. Finally, the service makes a decis access permissions according to the generate 3 Security Assertion Markup Language. tecture a VSB, has an evelops a proxy rvice. Thus, the the proxy of the S-Discovery and ted endpoint via nge. This policy curity token that nated STSs (1). which does not o the STS within Request Security that the STS ws the tokens e identity of the AML 3 formatted e response to the RSTR (Request he following :
the STS and d the proof key f the service to rypted with the . ation. expressed in the ion retrieves the age to be sent to hus, the service key of the STS, ts private key to al source of the sion in terms of ed claims (6).
C. Involved WS-* specificati
The secured VSB archit specifications in addition to W The following figure (se specifications : Figure 6 . Security W The federated architectur specifications:
• Client: the proxy imp to discover service protect the exchn SecureConversation
• The service: its endp to support the federa get the services d manage the events a to define security po generated tokens, SecureConversation.
• The Security Token pratically the same consume.
D. Towards a Vehicular Pro
Thanks to the VSB archit new profile adpated to the ve all the necessary security sp Services.
The following figure (se layers which contains in a Profile for Web Services) security specifications and protocols related to the ve (Vehicular Transport Protoco ions ecture involves so many WS-* WS-Fedreration. ee 
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To validate our work, we developed a POC (Proof Of Concept) application to solve the problem of the intersections management. In our POC, only the emergency vehicles are allowed to change the state of traffic light seamlessly. However, all vehicles are allowed to subscribe to the intersection management service in order to receive notifications about the road states.
The architecture of our application in terms of components is described by the following figure : We have supposed that all vehicles implement X.509 certificates 4 as native identities. However, the traffic light service requires other types of tokens formatted into SMAL and defined in the following table : It should be noted that we assumed that the architecture is already service oriented. Thus, our POC was designed to demonstrate the feasibility of SOA in the case of vehicular networks and test some important parameters such as time consumption during the message exchange.
We used the Visual Studio 2010 tool with C# language, the WCF and WIF 5 Frameworks to develop our POC.
The different application processes (vehicles processes, light services and intersection assistance system) were tested on a machine with the following characteristics :
• Model : MacBook of Apple.
• OS : Windows 7.
• RAM : 4Go DDR2 with 667 MHz.
• Processor : Intel Core 2 Duo T7250 with 2.16GHz.
We conducted performance tests on a vehicular application consuming the intersection service for two scenarios: direct and mutual authentication based on certificates. In each scenario, we modify the binding corresponding to the service and the application (transport protocol, security mode, cryptographic algorithms, etc.). After authentication, we record the average time between the date the message was sent and its interpretation at the application level during a cycle of light (green, orange, red).
Transport protocols that were subjects of our tests are TCP that has been used in [6] and HTTP of which a similar protocol was defined in [8] .
To answer the second problem, we have implemented the WS-Federation and many other security-related specifications such as WS-Security. This solution is feasible thanks to the architecture of the VSB based on Web Services and all WS-* specifications.
